Firm cash holdings increased substantially from 1980 to 2013. The overall distribution of …rm cash holdings changed in the same period. We study the implications of these changes for monetary policy. We use Compustat data and a model with …nancial frictions that allows the calculation of the monetary policy e¤ects according to the distribution of cash holdings. We …nd that the interest rate channel of the transmission of monetary policy has become more powerful, as the impact of monetary policy over real interest rates increased. With the observed changes in …rm cash holdings, the real interest rate takes 3.4 months more to return to its initial value after a shock to the nominal interest rate.
Introduction
We obtain predictions for the e¤ect on monetary policy of the changes in the distribution of corporate cash holdings. Bates et al. (2009) , Bover and Watson (2005) and others noticed the increase in corporate cash holdings since 1980, both in real terms and as a percentage of total cash. Corporate cash holdings corrected for in ‡ation increased …ve times from 1980 to 2010. The median cash-sales ratio increased from 3% in 1980 to 12% in 2010. The mean cash-sales ratio increased from 6% to 23% during the same period. 1 Corporate cash holdings, measured as cash and equivalents of the U.S. non…nancial …rms listed in Compustat, amounted to 1:56 trillion dollars in 2010. As M1 amounted to 1:84 trillion, according with the FED of St. Louis data, 1:56 trillion dollars corresponds to 85% of M1. The ratio of corporate cash holdings decreased from 2010 to 2013, as M1 has increased sharply more recently. Even so, corporate cash holdings to M1 was equal to 65% in 2013. This ratio was 29% in 1980 and 85% in 2010. As the demand for money from corporations is substantial, changes in corporate cash holdings can a¤ect monetary aggregates and monetary policy signi…cantly. 2 Our objective is to analyze the implications of the secular increase in corporate cash holdings on the e¤ects of monetary policy. We …nd that the real interest rate takes 3:4 more months in 2013 than in 1980 to revert to its initial value after a 1 Bates et al. (2009) concentrate on the cash-assets ratio, which shows a similar increase over time. As it will be clear when we introduce the model, it is more appropriate for our purposes to use the cash-sales ratio. 2 We restrict our sample to …rms with positive cash, positive assets, assets greater than cash, and sales greater than 10 million (CPI adjusted with base 1982 (CPI adjusted with base -1984 . We also truncated the …rms at the 1 and 99 percentiles of the cash-sales ratio. With the less stringent constraint of sales greater than zero, the increase in the median cash-sales ratio is from 3:5% to 13:4%, an increase of 3:8 times. There are di¤erent measures of cash holdings such as the cash-assets and the cash-net assets ratio. We use the cash-sales ratio because it has a better data counterpart to the variables in the model. We explain this variable in more detail in section 1. nominal interest rate shock. A consequence of this result is that, given the large current …rm cash holdings, an increase in interest rates today has a higher impact on real interest rates. To obtain our …ndings, we use a model that simulates the e¤ects on the real interest rate of a nominal interest rate shock. The main characteristic of the model is that it takes into account the observed distribution of money holdings over time. According to the model, the real interest rate takes 1:84 months to revert to its initial value with the distribution of money holdings of 1980, while with the 2013 distribution of money holdings, the real interest rate takes 5:25 months to revert to its initial value. Figure 1 shows how long the real interest rate takes to return to its initial value from 1980 to 2013 according to our simulations.
The increase in …rm cash holdings is related with the declining trend in the opportunity cost of cash. 3 The Aaa corporate bond yield decreased from 12% in 1980 to 4% in 2013 and the Baa corporate bond yield for the same period decreased from 14% to 5%. The opportunity cost of money is important to explain the evolution of …rms cash holdings. Figure 2 shows Aaa corporate bond yields and various measures of real cash. The elasticity of real cash holdings with respect to yields is clearly negative, with absolute values greater than 1 and highly signi…cant. 4 We study the implications of the increase in corporate cash holdings on the e¤ects of monetary policy. 5 As …rms hold a large portion of the monetary aggregates, it 3 There is a large literature on the determinants of …rm cash holdings. Among the explanations for …rm cash holdings, a partial list includes the transactions role of cash (Baumol 1952 , Tobin 1956 , Miller and Orr 1966 , Frenkel and Jovanovic 1980 , …nancial constraints (Almeida et al. 2004 , Acharya et al. 2007 ), tax purposes (Foley et al. 2007 ), agency problems (Kalcheva and Lins 2007) , and corporate governance (Jensen 1986 , Blanchard et al. 1994 , Dittmar et al. 2003 , Pinkowitz et al. 2006 , Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007 , Harford et al. 2008 , Yun 2009 , Bates et al. 2009 ). Empirically, the di¤erent determinants of …rm cash holdings are analyzed by Kim et al. (1998) , Opler et al. (1999) , and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) . 4 Figure A .1 in the appendix shows cash holdings over time together with Aaa and Baa Moody's corporate bond yields. 5 We analyze how changes in …rm cash holdings a¤ect macroeconomic variables. Fresard (2010) is important to study the e¤ects of the increase in cash holdings on macroeconomic variables. To the best of our knowledge, we are the …rst to study the consequences of the changes in the distribution of corporate cash for monetary policy. 6 A related paper is Cole and Ohanian (2002) , which studies how shifts in the demand for money a¤ect the macroeconomic impact of monetary shocks. We emphasize here the changes in the distribution of cash holdings across …rms. Cole and Ohanian (2002) …nd that changes in the relative demands for money between households and …rms have quantitatively important macroeconomic e¤ects in a liquidity model. 7
As we are interested in the e¤ects of the distribution of money holdings, we use a model in which the distribution of money holdings plays an active role. In the …rst cash-in-advance models such as Lucas and Stokey (1987) , Cooley and Hansen (1989) , and Hodrick et al. (1991) , the distribution of money holdings is degenerate.
All participants in the economy behave as a representative agent and they have the same demand for money. We cannot evaluate the impact of the distribution of money with these models because they do not allow any role for the distribution of money.
More recently, the real e¤ects of monetary policy have been studied in new Keynesian models (for example, Clarida et al. 1999 , Woodford 2003 , and Christiano et al. 2005 . These models contain frictions usually in the form of price rigidities.
There is a distribution of prices across …rms, but the distribution of money is again degenerate. A representative agent uses all money carried from the last period to buy and Palazzo (2012) study the real e¤ects of cash holdings on market share and equity returns. 6 A recent paper that studies the interaction of …rm cash holdings and macroeconomic variables is Bacchetta, Benhima, and Poilly (2014) . 7 Cole and Ohanian do not con…rm major changes in the e¤ects of money shocks over the postwar period, as indicated with VARs. However, as Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) point out, the procedure of comparing impulse responses from structural VARs to the theoretical impulse responses from models and rejecting the model if they are di¤erent can be misleading. In particular, this procedure cannot be used to reject the liquidity model, as liquidity models do not satisfy the set of identifying assumptions in VARs. products in the current period. As in the cash-in-advance models, the distribution of money holdings in these models does not a¤ect the results of monetary policy.
Other kinds of frictions, such as informational frictions (Mankiw and Reis 2002) and menu costs (Golosov and Lucas 2007) , have also been introduced to study the real e¤ects of monetary policy. Alternatively, Stein (1998) , Kashyap and Stein (2000) , and Bolton and Freixas (2006) focused on the role of bank lending.
Here, to take into account the e¤ects of changes in the distribution of cash holdings, we use a market segmentation model. The friction in this kind of model is the separation of markets for liquid and illiquid assets. Liquid assets are used for transactions while illiquid assets receive higher interest yields and are kept mainly as a reserve of value. These markets are separated in the sense that …rms cannot exchange illiquid assets for cash with a high frequency.
We modify the models in Silva (2012) to match the observed distribution of …rm cash holdings in the data. show that the model closely matches the short-run ‡uctuations in velocity. Here, we use the model to obtain a prediction about the e¤ects of the increase in cash holdings.
The prediction is obtained by calculating the response of the real interest rate to a nominal interest rate shock for each year from 1980 to 2013. Our model delivers closed-form solutions for each nominal interest shock. The shocks follow the interest rate dynamics in Christiano et al. (1999) and Uhlig (2005) . For each year, we recalibrate the model to …t the distribution of cash holdings. As the distribution of cash holdings changes, the response of the real interest rate changes.
The real e¤ects occur because the behavior of …rms with respect to the use of cash depends on their cash holdings at the time of the shock. Firms with little cash adapt faster to the shock while …rms with large cash holdings take longer to adapt.
If the market segmentation friction is removed, the real interest rate does not move after the shock and the real e¤ects vanish. As we want to isolate the e¤ects of the change in cash holdings, we eliminate other mechanisms besides market segmentation that could generate additional real e¤ects. In particular, there are no sticky prices, output is constant, and the only change in the economy during the period is in the distribution of cash holdings. The changes in …rm characteristics during the period are re ‡ected in the distribution of cash holdings.
Firms undertake infrequent portfolio rebalancing, as they exchange bonds for cash infrequently. Therefore, another way of understanding the causes of the real e¤ects of monetary shocks in the model is through the infrequent portfolio rebalancing. As …rms do not rebalance their portfolios instantaneously, they do change their behavior immediately when there is a monetary policy shock. This delayed e¤ect is more pronounced when …rms maintain larger amounts of cash. 8
In the data, there is a nondegenerate cross-sectional distribution of cash. Certainly, di¤erent …rm characteristics, such as their business and corporate governance, are re ‡ected in their behavior toward cash management. Heterogeneity across cash holdings changes the speed and the size of the adjustment to the shock. If all …rms held the same amount of cash, the mean level, for instance, then monetary shocks would have di¤erent real e¤ects. This property is not unique to our model, the new Keynesian Phillips curve model shares this property. Carvalho and Nechio (2011) show that heterogeneity in the price setting behavior of …rms implies aggregate dynamics substantially di¤erent from the case when all …rms have the same price setting behavior. Here, after the shock hits the economy, the initial phase of the adjustment process is driven mainly by the set of …rms with less cash. The later part of the 8 The impact of infrequent portfolio rebalancing has also been studied by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) to analyze the forward premium puzzle. Bachmann and Ma (2016) study …xed costs and investment dynamics. This literature is related to the separation of microeconomic and macroeconomic behavior caused by …xed adjustment costs. adjustment process is dominated by the set of …rms with larger stocks of cash.
We …nd that the e¤ects of monetary policy over the real interest rate are now more persistent than in 1980, as there has been a substantial increase in cash holdings by …rms since then. The e¤ects of monetary policy shocks become stronger, as monetary authorities have more ability to a¤ect real variables. Consistent with this idea, Clarida et al. (2000) state that monetary policy has been more e¤ective after 1980. 2. The Distribution of Cash Holdings over Time Figure 3 shows the median and the mean of the cash-sales ratio from 1980 to 2013.
Di¤erent measures of cash have been used to analyze …rm cash holdings such as the cash-net assets ratio (used, for example, by Opler et al. 1999 ) and the cash-assets ratio (by Bates et al. 2009 ). The cash-sales ratio has been used, among others, by Mulligan (1997) , Harford (1999) , Harford et al. (2008) , and Bover and Watson (2005) . Both, the cash-assets ratio and the cash-sales ratio, have been increasing substantially over time. The cash-assets ratio indicates the way in which a …rm allocates cash in its portfolio of assets. The cash-sales ratio indicates how much cash a …rm holds with respect to the ‡ow of resources obtained with its operations. It has a more direct interpretation in terms of the use of cash for transactions. The conclusions of this paper are robust to the use of one measure or the other. We use the cash-sales ratio because its interpretation-cash relative to the ‡ow of resources obtained-allows a better connection between the model parameters and the data. 9 9 Our measure of cash is cash and equivalents from Compustat, "cash and short-term investments," CHE, U.S. non…nancial …rms. CHE is not available for utilities, so the dataset removes this sector. To avoid anomalies, we remove observations with cash or assets equal to zero, and observations with cash greater than assets. To avoid extreme cash-sales ratios, we remove observations with sales smaller than 10 million and observations with cash/sales below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles of cash/sales. We later report results without this truncation, which barely changes results. We correct for in ‡ation with the CPI from the St. Louis Fed FRED dataset, CPIAUCSL, base 1982-84. For sales, we use SALE in Compustat. Our procedure implies 140,435 …rm-years or about 4,130 …rms per year.
As cash is measured in dollars and sales is measured in dollars per unit of time, the cash-sales ratio is a variable given in units of time. The median cash-sales ratio of 0:12 year in 2010, for example, means that …rms maintained about 1:4 months of their sales in the form of cash. In 1980, this same ratio was only 0:03, or 11 days.
The mean cash-sales ratio in the same period increased from 0:06 in 1980 to 0:23 in 2010. The distribution of the cash-sales ratio across …rms is highly asymmetric as it can be inferred by the di¤erence between its mean and median. The mean was more than two times the median during the whole period and it reached 5:8 times the median in 2000.
If there were no bene…ts of maintaining cash, …rms would choose a cash-sales ratio approximately equal to zero. In this way, …rms would minimize the opportunity cost of holding cash. As the cash-sales ratio is large, the data indicate the existence of costs in the management of money. These costs may be in the form of transaction costs or in the form of management costs. A portfolio manager, for example, may schedule sales of long term bonds to coincide with cash needs. However, this schedules of payments or other more elaborate mechanisms to economize on cash are costly. It does not matter the nature of the costs of managing cash holdings for our purposes.
What is important is that …rm cash holdings are considerable. We take the values of …rm cash holdings as given.
Usually, …rms maintain cash-sales ratios smaller than one. The 95th percentile of the distribution of the cash-sales ratio reached a maximum of 1:3 in 2000 and it was about 1 during 2002-2007. A cash-sales ratio above one means that a …rm keeps more than one year of sales in the form of cash. Firms that maintain high cash-sales ratios tend to be smaller …rms in terms of sales; the same is true for the cash-assets ratio. Figure 4 shows the median of the cash-sales ratio over the same period for …rms grouped in percentiles of sales. We see that the cash ratio increased for all groups. Moreover, while the cash ratio increased 3 times for all …rms as a whole, it increased 5 times for …rms in the smaller percentiles. Bates et al. (2009) show a similar evolution for the cash-assets ratio.
In addition to the increase in the cash-sales ratio, …rm cash holdings correspond to a large fraction of the monetary aggregates and this fraction has increased substantially. From 1980 to 2010, the ratio between …rm cash holdings to M1 increased from 30 percent to 85 percent. This fraction decreased to 65 percent in 2013, still more than two times the ratio in 1980. As we show in this paper, a consequence of the increase in the proportion of …rm cash holdings over monetary aggregates is that monetary policy has a much stronger e¤ect than it had in the past. 10 10 M1 is de…ned as currency plus traveler checks plus checkable deposits. In January 2014, currency corresponds to 43.6% of M1 and checkable deposits to 56.3%. The de…nition of cash and equivalents in Compustat includes the components of M1 and "securities readily transferable to cash," which includes short term commercial paper, short term government securities, and money market funds. In our sample, the cash portion of cash and equivalents correspond on average to 70% of cash and equivalents. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the cash-sales ratio for each year. The distributions look symmetric because the …gure shows the logs of the cash-sales ratio. The support and the median of the distribution of the cash-sales ratio increased during the period. The support of the distribution increased …rst and the median increased later. In 1980, the maximum cash-sales ratio was equal to 7 months, that is, below one year. The maximum cash ratio was above 1 year after 1983. In 2000, the maximum cash ratio was 5 years (the 95th percentile was 1:3). Figure 3 shows that the increase in the median of the cash ratio accelerated after 2000 and …gure 5 shows that the distribution of cash holdings changed substantially after this date. The two …gures complement each other as they show that …rm cash holdings changed especially after 2000.
As …gure 5 shows, the distribution of cash holdings across …rms is not uniform; it is far from degenerate; and it has changed over time. Our objective is to calculate the predictions of the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks under di¤erent distributions of cash holdings. In order to do so, we need a model that takes into account the The curves are approximately symmetric because it shows the logs of the cash-sales ratio; the actual distributions are highly asymmetric. Over the years, the support and the median of the cash-sales ratio increased. Source: Compustat; see note 9 for details. di¤erent distributions of cash holdings. We introduce this model in the next section.
The Model
The model combines the cash inventory framework analyzed by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) with the market segmentation framework introduced by Grossman and Weiss (1983), Rotemberg (1984) , and later studied, among others, by Grossman (1987), Silva (2012). 11 The economy is composed by heterogeneous in…nitely lived entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur owns one …rm, which produces the consumption good. The entrepreneurs produce, consume, borrow and hold cash. They are heterogeneous with respect to sales, bond and cash holdings. The entrepreneurs smooth their consumption using cash and non contingent bonds. Unlike bonds, cash pays no interest, but consumption must be paid out with cash.
There is market segmentation between the goods market and the assets market.
Each …rm has a bank account and a brokerage account. The bank account is used to hold cash for transactions in the goods market. The brokerage account is used to hold bonds. Market segmentation implies that entrepreneurs sell bonds for money and transfer the proceeds periodically from the assets market to the goods market, where they buy the consumption good. The opportunity cost of cash, the interest rate, determines the size of cash transfers, or equivalently the duration of the holding period, which is the elapsed time between cash transfers. 12
As di¤erent types of …rms in the economy have di¤erent average cash holdings we allow for distinct groups of …rms in the model, each one with a di¤erent holding period. In this way, we can better match the distribution of …rms' cash holdings observed in the data, which is given by …gure 5. The groups of …rms are indexed by i = 1; :::; I. The size of each group of …rms is given by v i , where P I i=1 v i = 1, and the holding period for the …rms that belong to group i is denoted by N i . The …rms in group i are distributed uniformly over the interval [0; N i ), for i = 1; :::; I, with N i < N i+1 , for i = 1; :::; I 1. Grossman (1987) also dispose agents uniformly over the holding period, but they only consider one group of …rms, i.e. one holding period size. In contrast, we allow for various holding periods with sizes fN i g I i=1 . Time is continuous, t 0. Let M 0i denote cash holdings at t = 0 of …rms in the group i and let B 0i denote bond holdings at t = 0 of …rms in the group i. Each …rm, s i ; is identi…ed by its initial portfolio, i.e. s i (M 0i ; B 0i ). Firms in group i produce Y i goods at time t and obtain P (t) Y i of sales at time t, where P (t) denotes the price level at time t. The proceeds of sales are deposited directly in the brokerage account and converted into bonds. The price of bonds at time t is given by
Let T ji (s i ), for j = 1; 2; :::, denote the times of the transfers of …rm s i , and de…ne T 0i (s i ) 0; as that will simplify the notation later. Thus, at T ji (s i ), for j = 1; 2; :::, …rm s i sells bonds for money and transfers the proceeds to the goods market (to its bank account). The jth holding period of …rm s i is [T j;i (s i ) ; T j+1;i (s i )), for j = 1; 2; :::. We have T j+1;i T j;i = N i for j = 1; 2; ::: for all s i …rms, with i = 1; :::; I. Cash holdings are denoted by M (t; s i ). Cash just after a transfer is denoted by M + (T ji (s i ) ; s i ) and is equal to lim t!T ji ;t>T ji M (t; s i ). Analogously, cash just before a transfer is denoted by M (T ji (s i ) ; s i ) and is equal to lim t!T ji ;t<T ji M (t; s i ).
The transfer amount from the brokerage account to the bank account is given by We formalize the problem of entrepreneur s i , who starts with assets (M 0i ; B 0i ), receives a ‡ow of funds P (t) Y i in the brokerage account, and aims to achieve an optimal amount of transactions c i (t; s i ). Because it simpli…es the analysis we take that the objective function of the entrepreneur to be logarithmic in the amount of transactions. The logarithmic utility allows us to obtain analytical solutions for the dynamics of the real interest rate after shocks.
responding right derivative for cash and c + i (T ji (s i ) ; s i ) are transactions just after the transfer. The solution to this problem minimizes the cost of holding cash over holding periods.
Using (3), we can write B i (T ji ) as a function of the interest payments accrued during [T j 1 ; T j ). Substituting recursively in (2), and using the no-Ponzi condition (5) states that the present value of cash transfers is equal to the initial bonds plus the present value of deposits in the brokerage account.
To minimize the cost of holding money, …rms make transfers and use cash during the holding periods so that M i (T j+1;i ) = 0. Cash transfers are just enough for the transactions during the holding period. Only M i (T 1;i ) might be positive because M 0i is given. As M i (T ji ) = 0, for j 2, then, from (4), cash at time t is given by
at the beginning of a holding period is given by
Below, instead of solving the problem of maximizing (1) subject to (2)-(4), we consider the simpler problem of maximizing (1) subject to the cash in advance constraint for the …rst period
and to (5), where M + i (T ji (s i ) ; s i ) is replaced by the right hand side of (6). The transactions, c i (t; s i ) ; and cash, M i (T 1i (s i )) ; that solve this simpler problem can be replaced in (2) and (3) to obtain the bonds, B i (t; s i ) :
The government executes monetary policy through open market operations in the assets market. The government supplies aggregate cash M (t). An increase in the supply of cash generates revenue _ M (t) =P (t). We abstract from government consumption or taxes to concentrate on the e¤ects of monetary policy. Thus, the government budget constraint is given by
The market clearing condition for cash is given by
where F is the distribution of s i . As stated above, F (s i ) is an uniform distribution over [0; N i ), for i = 1; :::; I. Similarly, the market clearing conditions for bonds and goods are given by
respectively.
The equilibrium is de…ned as a vector of prices fP (t) ; Q (t)g, and allocations
the government budget constraint holds; and the market clearing conditions for cash, bonds, and goods hold.
The Distribution of Cash Holdings
We characterize in this section the steady state equilibrium of the economy, that is, the equilibrium in which the in ‡ation rate and the interest rate are constant. In the next section, we study the e¤ects of a monetary shock when the economy is initially in the steady state.
As long as there is a positive opportunity cost of holding cash, it is optimal to start a holding period with some cash and spend it gradually until the next transfer, which initiates a new holding period. As a result, …rms engage in (S; s) policies on bonds and cash. The aggregate variables are obtained by the aggregation of these (S; s) policies across …rms. For constant in ‡ation and interest rate, the (S; s) policies of the …rms in each group have the same pattern. The relevant variable for the …rm is its position in the holding period. Let n i 2 [0; N i ) denote the position of a …rm of the group i in the holding period. Firm n i makes transfers from the brokerage account to the bank account at T 1;i (n i ) = n i , T 2;i (n i ) = n i + N i and so on.
Consider the pattern of transactions for each …rm. The …rst order condition for c i (t; n i ) of the problem of maximizing (1) subject to (5) and (6) 
is the Lagrange multiplier of (5). Let c 0i denote transactions at the beginning of a holding period for …rms in group i. The transactions during the holding periods of the …rms in group i are given by c i (t; n i ) = c 0i e (r )t e r(t T j;i ) , for j such that t 2 [T j;i (n i ) ; T j+1;i (n i )).
Integrating the transactions of all …rms in group i, we get the aggregate transactions
In the steady state equilibrium, the nominal interest rate is equal to the in ‡ation rate plus the real interest rate , i.e. r = + , since in the steady state the aggregate transactions of …rms in the same group are constant.
Transactions during holding periods must be equal to the cash generated by sales during the same holding period,
Given r = + , then c i (t; n i ) = c 0i e r(t T j;i ) . Substituting c 0i e r(t T j;i ) in the previous equation yields the value of transactions at the beginning of a holding period, c 0;i (1 e rN i )=(rN i ) = Y i . As we will parameterize the model using data on the cash-sales ratio of …rms, it is useful to characterize the variable transactions-sales ratio. Letĉ i c i =Y i denote the transactions-sales ratio of …rms in group i. We havê
which determinesĉ 0;i , given N i and r. The transactions-sales ratios during t 2 [T j;i (n i ) ; T j+1;i (n i )) for …rms in group i are given byĉ i (t; n i ) =ĉ 0i e r(t T j;i ) .
Aggregate cash holdings are equal to
, which is constant at the steady state since the aggregate cash holdings grow at the same rate as in ‡ation. In the appendix, we show that the aggregate cash-sales ratio in this economy is given by
The price level at time zero is equal to P 0 = M 0 = (mY ), where M 0 denotes the money supply at time zero and Y denotes aggregate sales.
The cash-sales ratios of the …rms in group i are given by m i (n i ) = M 0;i (n i )
is the initial cash holdings for each n i 2 [0; N i ). The M 0;i (n i ) compatible with an equilibrium where r and are constant is obtained by requiring that M 0;i (n i ) is just enough to cover transactions from t = 0
until the …rst transfer of …rm n i , at T 1;i (n i ) = n i . The M 0;i (n i ), for n i 2 [0; N i ) and i = 1; :::; I 1, are determined in the appendix. After dividing by P 0 Y i , we obtain the cash-sales ratio of …rms n i 2 [0; N i )
The cash-sales ratios have a distribution with support [0;
of the …rms' cash-sale ratios is given by 1
For the aggregate …rms in the economy, the density function is f (
Thus, in an economy with constant r and ; at any moment in time the cross section of the cash-sales ratio will be given by f (x), x 2 [0; max (m H i )).
In the data, the distribution of real money holdings is concentrated on small quantities of money, but it can be approximated by a weighted combination of uniform distributions. In the parameterization, the values of v i and m H i are set so that the model distribution of the cash-sales ratio approximates the actual distribution available in the Compustat data. Figure 6 shows an example with I = 4. instead of v i , we use the fraction of sales of …rms in group i with respect to total sales, v Y i , to obtain a counterpart with the data on cash-sales. 13 Figure 7 shows the logs of the cash-sales ratio, as the distribution of the levels is highly asymmetric toward small values of the cash-sales ratio. 
Firm Cash Holdings and Monetary Policy Shocks
The monetary policy is summarized by the nominal interest rate path r (t), t 0.
Since a change in r (t) a¤ects …rm i's cash holdings M i (t; n i ), when setting the interest rate path, the central bank has to adjust the money supply accordingly. The central bank supplies M (t) to satisfy the market clearing condition for cash. The interest rate path determines bond prices Q (t) = e R(t) , where R (t) = R t 0 r (s) ds. In the model, it is equivalent to set M (t) and obtain the equilibrium r (t) or to set r (t) and obtain the equilibrium M (t). However, it is computationally simpler to set r (t) to obtain the equilibrium prices through the relevant equilibrium equations.
Moreover, the evidence suggests that the practice of central banks is to set monetary
The advantage of using v Yi is that it allows the characterization of the equilibrium variables with the expression for the consumption-income ratio. policy through the interest rate. By focusing on r (t) as the target for the monetary policy, we follow the literature, for example, Woodford (2003) .
Let t = 0 be the time of the interest rate shock. When the unexpected change in the interest rate hits the economy …rms have di¤erent cash holdings. Firms with little cash are about to make a transfer. These …rms adapt faster to the shock because they will make a transfer soon after the shock. Firms with large cash holdings take longer to make their transfer. They can only adjust transactions until the moment they make the transfer. 14 The di¤erent reactions of the …rms with respect to transactions and transfers a¤ect the real interest rate. The gradual reactions of the …rms, after an increase in the nominal interest rate, make the price level move slower than if there was no market segmentation. Thus, as the real interest rate is equal to the di¤erence between the nominal interest rate and the rate of in ‡ation, the real interest rate increases together with the nominal interest rate just after a positive shock. 15 Let rr (t) denote the real interest rate and (t) denote the rate of in ‡ation, (t) _ P (t) =P (t). The real interest rate at each moment is given by rr (t) = r (t) (t),
for t 0. To obtain rr (t), we have to determine the price level at each time P (t).
The shock occurs when the economy is in a steady state with constant interest rate r and constant in ‡ation . Before the shock, the real interest rate is and r = + .
Cash and bond holdings of …rm i at the time of the shock, M 0;i (n i ) and B 0;i (n i ), are the steady state values corresponding to the nominal interest rate r. These cash holdings represent the choices before the shock. As Grossman (1987) , we assume that 14 Christiano, et al. (1996) present evidence that …rms take some time to adjust their portfolios after an interest rate shock. Adjustments are not instantaneous. 15 A slow response of prices and an increase in the real interest rate after an increase in the nominal interest rate is found in many empirical studies. Among others, Cochrane (1994) , Christiano et al. (1999) , Khan et al. (2002) , Bernanke et al. (2005) , and Uhlig (2005). bonds B 0;i (n i ) are contingent to the shock, but cash is not. According to Grossman (1987) the problem of the entrepreneur needs to be extended to two states of nature.
In one state of nature, the economy continues in the steady state and in the other state of nature the nominal interest rate follows r (t). This problem is stated and solved formally in the appendix.
The equilibrium price level is obtained through the market clearing condition for goods. At time t; not long after the shock, there will be …rms in each group i that have made a transfer already, and other …rms that have not made a transfer yet after the shock. Firms that have not made the transfer yet, must do transactions using what is left out of M 0;i (n i ). Firms that have made the transfer already, are …rms with smaller values of n i 2 [0; N i ), as they make the …rst transfer at T 1;i = n i .
Aggregate transactions for all …rms in group i are given by
where i (n i ) = 1=(P 0 c 0;i (n i )) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the intertemporal budget constraint and i (n i ) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the cash in advance constraint of the …rst period; the value of i (n i ) depends on M 0;i (n i ) and it is determined in the appendix. The second term in the right of equation (11) explains most of the transactions when t is close to zero; and the …rst term determines most of the transactions when t is close to N i . The interpretation is that when most …rms have not yet reacted to the shock, i.e. t is close to zero, the value of (n i ) is important to determine consumption and ultimately to determine prices.
The equilibrium price path P (t) is obtained by equating aggregate demand, P v i C i (t), to aggregate sales, Y . The logarithm utility allows us to isolate P (t). In order to obtain a counterpart with the data on cash-sales, we rewrite the equation in terms of the fraction of sales of …rms in group i with respect to total sales, which we denote by v Y i . Proposition 1 describes the solution for prices obtained with equation (11). The version of the market segmentation model that we use gives us great ‡exibility. Apart from the integral in e R(n) , which can be solved easily with numerical methods, we have closed-form solutions for the price level for any r (t). 16
Proposition 1 Prices after shocks. The equilibrium price level P (t) after a nominal interest rate shock with path r (t), t 0, is given by
. . .
where R (n i ) R n i 0 r (s) ds.
As M 0;i (n i ) are cash holdings in the initial steady state, they can be too large for the new interest rate path r (t). After the shock …rms may choose, to make a transfer before their stock of money vanishes, i.e. M i (T 1;i (n i ) ; n i ) > 0. In the proof of proposition 1, we show that will not happen, i.e. M i (T 1;i (n i ) ; n i ) = 0 for any r (t). When there is a shock, …rms adapt to the shock by changing transactions rather than choosing M i (T 1;i (n i ) ; n i ) > 0.
Proposition 1 implies that monetary policy a¤ects real interest rates. According to the Fisher relation rr (t) = r (t) (t), the real interest rate changes after a nominal interest rate shock if in ‡ation moves slowly after the shock. In a standard cash-inadvance model, (t) changes instantaneously after a shock to r (t) and rr (t) remains constant. Here, (t) remains constant just after the shock and changes gradually because of the market segmentation. As a result, the real interest rate increases with the increase in the nominal interest rate.
We can determine the e¤ects of market segmentation using (12). Suppose, for example, that the shock is a permanent increase of the nominal interest rate from r 1 to r 2 . Before the shock, in ‡ation is equal to r 1 and the real interest rate is equal to . We have e R(t) = e r 2 t . Solving for _ P (t) =P (t), we obtain that in ‡ation just after the shock is equal to r 1 , its value before the shock, and the real interest rate increases to + r 2 r 1 . For t max(N i ) = N I , we have P (t) = ke (r 2 )t , where k is a positive constant. Only after N I , when all …rms have made their …rst bond trade after the shock, does in ‡ation increase to r 2 . If N I is a large number, it will take longer for in ‡ation to converge to its value at the new steady state and the e¤ects on the real interest rate will be more prolonged. A nominal shock, however, cannot a¤ect real variables inde…nitely. As time goes by, the real interest decreases gradually to its steady state value, .
Proposition 2 establishes these two results: just after the shock the real interest rate increases by the same amount as the nominal interest rate and the real interest rate does not move if we eliminate market segmentation.
Proposition 2 Slow reaction of prices. For any interest rate path r (t) announced at time t = 0, the price level and the in ‡ation rate do not move just after the shock, that is, P (0) = P 0 , (0) = r . Moreover, the change in the real interest rate at t = 0 is equal to the change in the nominal interest rate, rr (0) = r (0) r.
If N i ! 0, for all i = 1; : : : ; I, the real interest rate is constant and equal to for any r(t) and all t 0.
Consider now a monetary policy shock as the one estimated by Uhlig (2005) .
According to …gure 2, plot 6, in Uhlig, reproduced in …gure 8, a monetary policy shock, described as an increase in the federal funds rate, initially increases the interest rate 0:3 percentage points and gradually decreases the interest rate towards its initial value. On average, the interest rate returns to its initial value in about 2 years and stays below its initial value for some time until it returns to zero. We approximate this shock with the process for the interest rate given by r (t) = r 1 + (r 2 r 1 + Bt) e t , also depicted in …gure 8, where r 2 r 1 = 0:3 percentage points per year. We set B
and so that r (t) approximates the average impulse response of the federal funds rate as estimated by Uhlig (2005) . We set = 3 percent per year. 17 The estimation in …gure 8, as explained by Uhlig, uses a range of OLS estimates of a VAR. We later use di¤erent estimates for the monetary policy shock for comparison. 18
Given the distributions of the cash-sales ratio from 1980 to 2013, we hit the economy with the shock r (t) and obtain the real interest rate path using the expressions of proposition 1. As explained in section 4, the cash-sales distribution for each year is obtained by determining the values of v Y i and N i so that the distribution of the cash-sales ratio from the model approximates the actual distribution of the cash-sales ratio given by Compustat data. 19 According to proposition 1, the real interest rate rr (t) implied by the shock to r (t) depends on the distribution of the cash-sales ratio 17 This value for has been used by Lucas (2000) , Silva (2012) , among others. It implies that a nominal interest rate of 3 percent per year in the steady state generates zero in ‡ation. 18 The expression of r (t) is the result of the di¤erential equation m r (t) + c r (t) + kr (t) = 0, = c= (2m), which describes a dampened shock. We set r 1 = 3% p.a. and r 2 = 3:3% p.a. Figure  8 expresses the results as the di¤erence from the initial value of the nominal interest rate. In our simulations, t denotes one day and we divide the year in 360 days. B = 0:15% and = 0:30, for r (t) given in percentage per year.
19 Table A .1 in the appendix shows the values of v Y i and N i for 1980 and 2010. across …rms. The paths for the real interest rates for each year are our predicted e¤ects of shocks to r (t) given the distributions of the cash-sales ratio. Figure 9 shows the equilibrium real interest rate obtained from the model for the cash-sales distributions of the selected years from 1980 to 2013 as shown in …gure 5. We show the di¤erence in percentage points from the initial value of the real interest rate. For a standard cash-in-advance model, we would have a straight line after the shock, rr (t) = 0, as a standard cash-in-advance model implies an instantaneous reaction of prices and no change in real interest rates. Here, with market segmentation, the real interest rate increases after the nominal interest rate shock and returns gradually to its initial value.
We measure the e¤ect of monetary policy by the time that it takes for the real interest rate to reach its initial value. In …gure 9, we have, for example, that the real interest rate reaches its initial value in 1:84 month given the cash distribution of 1980. Given the cash distribution of 2013, the real interest rate reaches its initial The e¤ect on the real interest rate implied by the model changes as the distribution of cash-sales ratio changes from 1980 to 2013. The recent distribution of cash-sales makes the real interest rate take longer to return to its initial value. The monetary authority, therefore, is able to a¤ect the real interest for a longer period.
To check the robustness of our results, we simulate the economy with di¤erent paths for the monetary policy shock and with di¤erent cash aggregates. We use other identi…cation methods of the shock, recalculate the parameters B and of the process for r (t), and obtain the e¤ect of the shock for the di¤erent estimates.
Besides using di¤erent identi…cation methods for the monetary policy shock, we verify our results with di¤erent cash aggregates. Our results in …gure 1 use cash and equivalents (CHE) for the distribution of cash across …rms, as CHE is the variable usually used for …rm cash holdings. 20 It may be argued, however, that CHE contains variables that are not in traditional monetary aggregates such as short-term marketable security, which is part of CHE but not of M1. 21 To check whether we maintain our results with a more restricted variable for …rm cash holdings, we repeat the exercise using only the cash component of cash and equivalents (CH instead of CHE).
We use three forms of identi…cation of the monetary policy shock, provided by Uhlig (2005) . In the …rst, used to obtain the results of …gure 1, Uhlig generates impulse-response functions, obtained from an OLS estimate of a VAR, that satis…es sign restrictions for the monetary policy shock and the price level for six months after the shock. The second method of identi…cation follows a conventional identi…cation procedure found, for example, in Christiano et al. (1999) . This method uses a standard Cholesky decomposition and there is no imposition of sign restrictions. The third method, called pure-sign-restriction approach by Uhlig, also imposes sign restrictions for the identi…cation and uses Bayesian methods. The OLS estimate and the pure-20 Cash and equivalents is used, for example, by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , Bover and Watson (2005) , Bates, Kahle and Stultz (2009), Bacchetta, Benhima, and Poilly (2014), among others. 21 A substantial part of CHE, in any case, is comprised by cash, which, by the industrial de…nition, "represents any immediately negotiable medium of exchange or any instruments normally accepted by banks for deposit and immediate credit to a customer's account" (Compustat). This de…nition closely resembles the de…nition of M1. sign-restriction approach produce similar results, although the pure-sign-restriction approach satis…es additional technical requirements. The conventional identi…cation implies a larger increase of the interest rate at the time of the shock and a more persistent shock as compared with the OLS estimate. The pure-sign-restriction approach implies a smaller shock at the time of the shock and a somewhat more persistent shock. The shock identi…ed with the OLS estimate is in between the pure-signrestriction approach and the conventional identi…cation. 22 With the three di¤erent identi…cation methods for the monetary policy shock and the two variables for cash holdings, we have a total of six di¤erent simulations. The results of these simulations are in …gure 10. For comparison, the results in …gure 1 are repeated in the …rst plot of …gure 10 for the case with CHE. Months to return to the initial interest rate with di¤erent iden-ti…cation methods for r(t) and di¤erent cash aggregates. Di¤erent estimates for r(t) from Uhlig (2005) . OLS estimate: VAR with sign restrictions obtained by OLS and random draws of possible impulse-response functions. Conventional identi…cation: conventional VAR without sign restrictions. Pure-sign-restriction approach: VAR with sign restrictions obtained with Bayesian methods. CHE: simulations with cash and equivalents. CH: simulations with the cash portion of cash and equivalents. The results in …gure (1) are repeated in the …rst plot with CHE. For all cases, the time to return to the initial value of the real interest rate increases substantially.
All simulations imply that the time that it takes for the real interest rate to return to its initial value increases as we change the cross-sectional distribution of cash holdings from 1980 to 2013. The pure-sign-restriction approach implies a smaller monetary policy shock. As a result, the simulations yield smaller e¤ects on the real interest rate. The time during which the real interest rate is above its initial value increases from 1:7 month in 1980 to 4:6 months in 2013, using the CHE aggregate, compared with an increase from 1:8 month to 5:3 months with the OLS estimate.
The increase in cash holdings would therefore imply an increase on the e¤ects of the real interest rate of 2:9 months according with the pure-sign-restriction and 3:5
according with the OLS estimate. On the other hand, the conventional identi…cation method for the monetary policy shock implies a larger shock and a more persistent interest rate shock. The simulations then yield longer e¤ects on the real interest rate. They also yield a larger di¤erence between the duration in 1980 and 2013. The real interest rate takes 1:9 month in 1980 and 5:6 months in 2013 to return to its initial value. The e¤ect of the increase in cash holdings is then 3:7 months with the conventional identi…cation.
The use of CH instead of CHE for the cash aggregate, also implies a more prolonged e¤ect of monetary policy under the cash distribution of recent periods. CHE implies larger e¤ects of monetary policy, although the e¤ects in percentage terms are larger with CH. The predictions about the large increase in the time for the real interest rate to return to its initial value are valid for both CH and CHE. The di¤erence of the time for the real interest rate to return to its initial value is less than 1 month on average for the simulations made with either CH or with CHE. 23
Our simulations have the objective of isolating the e¤ect of the changes in the level of cash holdings and in the cross-sectional distribution of cash holdings from 1980 to 2013. Our point is that the increase from 1:9 month in 1980 to 5:6 month in 2013
can be attributed, according to our simulations, to the changes the behavior toward cash holdings over the period. The model used by us, with market segmentation and a non-degenerate distribution of cash holdings, is particularly useful to obtain these predictions.
The exercises with alternative calibration methods, di¤erent interest rate shocks and di¤erent cash aggregates shocks, summarized in …gure 10, show that our predictions are not sensitive to changes around the setup of our …rst results. We still …nd that the recent changes in the distribution of cash holdings generates a longer period during which the real interest rate is a¤ected by monetary policy. The conclusion that the current distribution of …rm cash holdings implies stronger e¤ects of monetary policy shocks is a robust …nding.
Conclusions
We show that the recent increase in cash holdings by …rms has strong macroeconomic consequences. We …nd that it a¤ects the response of the real interest rate to nominal interest rate shocks. The e¤ect of …rm cash holdings on monetary policy is substantial. According to our predictions, the changes in the distribution of cash holdings from 1980 to 2013 imply that the real interest rates takes 3:4 months more in 2013 than in 1980 to return to its initial value after a shock. 
Aggregate transactions
Proof. Let i (n i ) and i (n i ) denote the Lagrange multipliers on (5) and (7). The …rst order conditions imply P (t) c (t; n i ) = e t e R(Tji) (n i ) , t 2 (T ji ; T j+1i ); (A.1)
3) j = 1; 2; :::, i = 1; :::I. Similarly, P (t) c (t; n i ) = e t (ni) , t 2 (0; T 1i ), P (0) c + (0; n i ) = 1 (ni) , and
(ni) . The …rst transfer occurs at T 1i = n i . For M i (n i ), Q (T 1i ) (n i ) (n i ) 0, with equality if M i (n i ) > 0. Therefore, the …rst order conditions for transactions imply that nominal transactions P (t) c (t; n i ) decrease at the rate within holding periods. Together with the constraints (5) and (7), the …rst order conditions imply The values of M 0i (n i ) and W 0i (n i ) such that the economy is in an equilibrium with constant interest rate at t = 0 are such that (1) nominal transactions P (t) c (t; n i ) evolve at the steady state rate and (2) all …rms start a holding period with transactions c 0i , excluding the shorter holding period from t = 0 to t = n i . The …rst order conditions imply (t) + _ c(t;ni) c(t;ni) = . So, spending decreases at the rate and, in the steady state, transactions decrease at the rate + = r. For an arbitrary …rm n i , nominal transactions at t = 0 are P 0 c (0; n i ) = P 0 c 0i e r(Ni ni) , where P 0 is the price level at t = 0 in the steady state before the shock hits the economy. The value c 0i e r(Ni ni) implies that …rm n i makes transactions c 0i just after the …rst bond trade. Therefore, from R ni 0 P (t) c (t; n i ) dt + M i (n i ) = M 0i (n i ), imposing M i (n i ) = 0, we obtain M 0i (n i ) = P 0 c 0i e r(Ni ni) 1 e ni : (A.6)
Tji P (t) c (t; n i ) dt. We have T ji = n i + N i (j 1), j = 1; 2; :::; for the times of the transfer periods. As Q (T ji ) = e rTji and transactions decrease at the rate at the steady state, then W 0i (n i ) = P 0 c 0i e ni : (A.7)
Using constraints (5) and (7) with M i (T 1i n i ) = 0 and the …rst order conditions, we obtain (n i ) = 1 e n i M0(ni) and (n i ) = e n i W0i(ni) . Substituting M 0i (n i ) and W 0i (n i ) implies (n i ) = e r(N i n i ) P0c0i and i (n i ) = 1 P0c0i . The condition to verify whether M i (T 1i (n i )) = 0 is (n i ) > Q (T 1 ) (n i ), which holds as e rNi > 1. Having obtained W 0i (n i ), we obtain B 0i (n i ) = W 0i (n i )
To obtain aggregate transactions, suppose an arbitrary t N i (the argument is similar for t < N i ). As t N i , we know that …rm n i has already made the …rst transfer. As transactions decrease at the rate r, we have c (t; n i ) = c 0i e r(t Tji(ni)) , for the highest j (n i ) such that T ji (n i ) t < T j+1i (n i ). Firms with n i 2 [0; t jN i ) are in their (j + 1)th holding period while …rms with n i 2 [t jN; N i ) are in their jth holding period. Aggregate transactions are then given by
c 0i e r(t Tji(ni)) dn i :
Changing variables to s i T j+1i = n i + jN i and s i T ji = n i + (j 1)N i in the …rst and second integrals, we obtain C i (t) = 1 Ni R t t Ni c 0i e r(t si) ds i . With another change of variables,
Cash-sales ratio
To obtain the cash-sales ratio, denoted by m = M (t) P (t)Y , …rst note that aggregate cash holdings grows at the same rate of in ‡ation in the steady state. Therefore, the cash-sales ratio is constant in the steady state. In particular, m = M (0) P0Y . At time zero, aggregate cash holdings are equal to M (0) = 1 N i R Ni 0 M 0 (n i ) dn i . Substituting the values found for M 0 (n i ) and dividing by P 0 Y , we obtain m i = e rNi rN i 1 e rNi e rNi 1 rN i e (r )Ni 1 (r ) N i : (A.9)
Finally, as M (0) and Y are normalized to 1, we obtain P 0 = 1=m. With this …nal step, we obtain all equilibrium prices and quantities for the steady state.
Maximization problem for the transition There are two states for the interest rate path, s = 1; 2, and there are two contingent bonds. In state 1, the nominal interest rate path is the constant initial steady state interest rate r. In state 2, the nominal interest rate is di¤erent; it is equal to the unexpected path r (t). Let denote the probability of state 1. For s = 1; 2, let c (t; n i ; s) denote consumption of entrepreneur n i at date t in state s, and T j;i (n i ; s) denote the date of the jth transfer of entrepreneur n i in state s. As money is not contingent on the states, entrepreneur n i must use the initial stock of money M 0i (n i ) from t = 0 until the …rst transfer T 1;i (n i ; s). In this framework, from t = 0 to T 1;i (n i ; s), each entrepreneur has two cash-in-advance constraints, one for each state, Z T1;i(ni;s) 0 P (t; s) c i (t; n i ; s) dt + M 0;i (n i ; s) = M 0;i (n i ) ; for s = 1; 2:
(A.10)
After T 1;i (n i ; s), on the other hand, there is just one intertemporal budget constraint, because entrepreneurs use contingent bonds to transfer resources between states.
The maximization problem of each entrepreneur is max 1 X j=0 Z Tj+1;i(ni;1)
Tj;i(ni;1) e t u (c i (t; n i ; 1)) dt + (1 ) 1 X j=0 Z Tj+1;i(ni;2) Tj;i(ni;2) e t u (c i (t; n i ; 2)) dt (A.11) subject to where W 0;i (n i ) B 0;i (n i ) + P s=1;2 R 1 0 Q (t; s) P (t; s) Y dt. The …rst order conditions with respect to c i (t; n i ) in the state 2 imply, for j 2, c + (T j;i (n i ) ; n i ) [R (T j;i (n i )) R (T j 1;i (n i ))] = r (T j (n i )) Z Tj+1;i(ni) Tj;i(ni) P (t) c i (t; n i ) P (T j;i (n i )) dt; (A.14)
where c + (T j;i (n i ) ; n i ) = [ (n i ) e Tj;i(ni) Q (T j;i (n i )) P (T j;i (n i ))] 1 : (A.15) For T 1 (n i ), the …rst order conditions imply c + (T 1 ; n i ) R (T 1 (n i )) log (n i ) (n i ) + r (T 1 (n i )) M i (n i ) P (T 1 (n i )) = r (T 1 (n i )) Z T2(ni) T1(ni) P (t) c (t; n i ) P (T 1 (n i )) dt:
(A.16) Proposition 1. Proof. First, we prove that all …rms choose M i (n i ) = 0 under the new interest rate path r (t), given the initial cash and bond holdings M 0i (n i ) and W 0i (n i ) of the …rst steady state. As a result the Lagrange multipliers (n i ) and (n i ) do not change with the shock. To show this statement, we have to show that the su¢ cient condition for M i (n i ) = 0, given by (n i ) > Q (n i ) (n i ), holds for every n i . We have (n i ) = e ni W 0 (n i ) + Q (n i ) M i (n i ) ; (A.17) (n i ) = 1 e ni [M 0 (n i ) M i (n i )] (A.18) together with the …rst order conditions and the budget constraints. Substituting the values of M 0i (n i ) and W 0i (n i ) for the initial equilibrium, we have that the condition for M i (n i ) = 0 holds if and only if e r(Ni ni) > Q (n i ), which is always true as Q (n i ) < 1 (moreover, (n i ) = Q (n i ) (n i ) cannot hold for M i (n i ) > 0). We obtain the price level at each time with the market clearing condition for transactions. For t N i , all …rms in group i have already made their …rst bond trade. Working similarly as above, substituting (n i ) = 1 P0c0i , aggregate transactions for all …rms in group i are given by
For t N i , …rms n i 2 [0; t jN i ) are in their (j + 1)th holding period and …rms with n i 2 [t jN; N i ) are in their jth holding period. We have, therefore,
e t e R(ni) P (t) dn i : (A.20) For 0 t < N i , …rms with n i 2 [0; t) have already made their …rst bond trade and …rms with n i 2 [t; N i ) are in the short holding period from zero to t = n i . Let real transactions of these two groups be denoted by C 1 i (t) = P0c0i Ni R t 0 e t e R(n i ) P (t) dn i and C 0 i (t) = 1 Ni R Ni t e t (ni)P (t) dn i . Aggregate real transactions are then C i (t) = C 1 i (t) + C 0 i (t). As t ! N i , the …rms in group i that have not made a transfer decrease, and so C 0 i (t) decreases to zero. Substituting (n i ) = e r(N i n i ) P0c0i , we obtain C 0 i (t) = P 0 c 0i e t (1 e r(Ni t) ) P (t) rN ;
(A.21)
where r is the nominal interest rate before the shock. Using P v i C i (t) = Y , we obtain the P (t) in the statement of the proposition.
Proposition 2. Proof. Without loss of generality we assume I = 1: We get P (0) = P 0 by using the formula of P (t) for t = 0. Also, lim t!0 P (t) = P 0 , which shows that P (t) is continuous at t = 0, and so does not jump at the time of the shock. When t < N 1 the derivative of P (t) with respect to t is _ P (t) = k[ e t R t 0 e R(n) dn + e t e R(t) e t +(r )e (r )t e rN r ], where k is a constant. So, in ‡ation just after the shock remains equal to in ‡ation before the shock, (0) = r = for any r (t). As the real interest rate before the shock is , we have rr (0) = r (0) r. We have rr (t) = r (t) (t) ) rr (t) = + r (t) e R(t) e R(t N I ) R t t N I e R(ni) dn i ; (A.22) using the formula of P (t) for t N I . We obtain lim N !0 rr (t) = + r (t) r (t) = , which implies that the real interest rate is constant for any r (t) if there is no market segmentation and, consequently, no heterogeneity in the distribution of cash holdings.
